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LISA MARAKIS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No, 20855 
* * * * * * * * * 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
* * * * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR CARBON 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE 
* * * * * * * * * 
WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. 
BEVERLEY A. RAMSEY, for 
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2696 N. University Ave., Suite 22Q 
Provo, UT 84604 
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NEW MATTERS SET FORTH 
IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1 Defendant,, asserts that PI a i n 11 f * • £ arpea I : F - ^ v 
moot because "the 1 986 legislature specifical"v iidressec * 
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(Respondent's Brief, page 5) 
2. Defendant asserts that the statutor*- anguaa* 
Senate Bi 11 9] governs, to wit: 
When a covered person claims an uninsured motor 
vehicle under subsection (2)(b) (an unidentified 
motor vehicle which left the scene of an acci-
dent proximately caused by its operator) proxi-
mately caused an accident without touching the 
covered person or the vehicle occupied by the 
covered person, then the covered person shall 
show the existence of the other motor vehicle by 
clear and convincing evidence, which shall con-
sist of more than the covered person's testimony. 
A correct reading of the record herein indicates that 
Senate Bill 91 cited by Defendant is not controlling in this 
case nor does it render this appeal moot for the following rea-
sons: 
I. ALL REFERENCES TO THE LANGUAGE OF ANY STATUTE NOT IN 
EFFECT ON THE DATE OF THE INJURY SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM THE 
RECORD AND NOT CONSIDERED. 
Lisa Marakis, the Plaintiff below, was injured on September 
4, 1982. At the time of said injury, the uninsured motorist sta-
tute in Utah, which is analyzed thoroughly in Plaintiff's brief, 
did not require that a claim such as Plaintiff's be corrroborated 
by evidence other than Plaintiff's testimony, nor did it require 
that physical contact be evidenced before an uninsured motorists 
claim could be paid. 
The statute cited by Defendant as Senate Bill 91 is not 
now the law of this state and does not become such until July 1, 
1986. Hor does the prospective statute cited by Defendant con-
tain any clause which makes it retroactive or which purports that 
it is a "clarification" of any prior legislative intent. Indeed, 
the 1986 legislature is not vested with the power to determine 
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what the legislative intent of a prior legislature was or should 
have been. 
Therefore, Defendant's reliance in April of 1986 upon a 
statute which will not become law for three more months is ill-
founded, irrelevant and should be stricken from the record and 
excluded from consideration herein, 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM RECOVERY UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SENATE 
BILL 91. 
The focus of that portion of Senate Bill 91 upon which 
Defendant relies is not physical contact but the credibility of 
the insured. The new law, when it goes into effect, will require 
the insured to convince the court that there was, indeed, another 
car which caused the injury. 
In the instant case, in its original Ruling on Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated April 30, 1985, the trial court wrote 
"Based upon the affidavit submitted by Plaintiff/ the court finds 
that there is no disputed issue of material fact in this case." 
The court then ruled as a matter of law that "the provisions in 
Defendant's insurance policy requiring physical contact before 
the insurance claim is viable as to an uninsured motorist acci-
dent, is void and unenforceable and against public policy." 
Defendant then moved to set the summary judgment aside. 
In doing so, it presented to the trial court no affidavits dis-
puting the material facts presented in Plaintiff's affidavit. 
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Defendant's focus was on, rather, a legal argument that physical 
contact was required. 
In reconsidering its original summary judgment in its 
ruling dated July 11, 1985, the trial court indicated on page 2 
of its ruling that it relied on Plaintiff's answers to request 
for admissions, answer to interrogatories and memorandum, which 
included her affidavit. At no time did the trial court ever 
assert that it did not believe another vehicle was involved. 
In its July 11, 1985 ruling the trial court, having thus 
found that the facts as asserted under oath by Plaintiff were un-
disputed, found that in all cases physical contact was required. 
It is evident that the issue before the trial court was 
never whether Plaintiff's assertions were corroborated. Indeed, 
the trial court found that the facts asserted by Plaintiff were 
undisputed. That finding is not appealed from and must be 
relied upon by the appellate court in deciding this case. 
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in 
finding that physical contact was required in all cases, even 
in cases where the parties did not dispute the existence of a 
second vehicle. 
Even if this court applies the criteria set forth in 
Senate Bill 91 to this case, the trial court erred. The law 
effective July 1, 1986, upon which Defendant relies, does not 
require physical contact in every case, as the ruling of the 
trial court herein would. 
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Under the state of the law at the present time and at the 
time the summary judgment was entered herein, Plaintiff had, to 
the trial courtfs satisfaction, met the burden of proof relative 
to the facts of the accident. Therefore Plaintiff is entitled 
to recover and the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment to Defendant. 
DATED this /*> day of d ^ ^ ' , 1986 
WAYN^jr. WATSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Piantiff-Appellant 
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